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Using Global Themes to Reframe
the Bioprospecting Debate
JONATHAN B. WARNER*
ABSTRACT
The objective of this Note is to use global themes and perspectives to aid in re-
framing the bioprospecting debate. The current state of this debate, its problems, and
proposed solutions are reviewed. In looking at the impact of local responses to global-
ization on bioprospecting themes, I propose that more internationally competitive
laws could allow an escape from some of the undesired effects of bioprospecting, while
promoting more desired effects. I also suggest, independently, that undesired effects
could be avoided and desired effects promoted through methods that seek to recognize
the global identity of concerned citizens.
INTRODUCTION
Bioprospecting, or "biopiracy,"1 begins when firms from developed coun-
tries, such as multinational corporations based in the United States, interact with
aboriginal or indigenous cultures in developing countries. The firms learn the
"traditional knowledge" of these cultures, especially as that knowledge is ap-
plied to biotechnology. This knowledge is then appropriated by that firm under
*J.D., 2006, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. I would like to thank Lisa,
Matt, and the rest of my family for their support and encouragement. I would also like to thank
Professor Sean Pager and the staff of the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, especially Karen
Levy, for their review, comments, expertise, and dedication.
1. See, e.g., VANDANA SHIVA, PROTECT OR PLUNDER? UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTs 49 (2001) ("Biopiracy refers to the use of intellectual property systems to legitimize the ex-
clusive ownership and control over biological resources and biological products and processes that
have been used over centuries in non-industrialized cultures."). Dr. Shiva goes on to distinguish
bioprospecting as a subclass of biopiracy that offers benefits of sharing, id. at 63-68, but I use the
terms synonymously to avoid the negative connotations that accompany the term "biopiracy." My
use of "bioprospecting" also follows from the World Resources Institute's definition of"biodiver-
sity prospecting," id. at 64, as well as other commentators' use on the subject. E.g., Emily Marden,
The Neem Tree Patent: International Conflict over the Commodification of Life, 22 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 279, 279 (1999).
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the developed country's intellectual property laws, to the exclusion of the indige-
nous cultures from which that knowledge originated.
Some commentators have deemed the current rhetoric in the bioprospect-
ing debate inadequate to generate "grass roots support."'2 The objective of this
Note is to use global themes and perspectives to aid in reframing the bio-
prospecting debate. In doing so, this Note will first provide a general review of
the current rhetoric of this debate, including negative effects of bioprospecting
and commonly proposed solutions to these effects. This Note will then apply
global themes to the bioprospecting debate and propose a legal approach that at-
tempts to harmonize these themes with many of the underlying issues.
As background, in applying global perspectives to analyze this phenome-
non, this Note incorporates an understanding of globalization that includes the
movement of goods, knowledge, and technology across international borders.'
This understanding is focused upon international competition and local re-
sponses to globalization. This understanding also considers whether increased
globalization correlates to increased socioeconomic inequality or instead to a re-
duction of poverty, and what can be done to change the status quo in promotion
of "the common good."4
Part I of this Note provides a general overview of the phenomenon of bio-
prospecting, including definitions, scope of the present discussion's use of that
term, and examples. Part II reviews commonly accepted effects of bioprospect-
ing, notably neocolonialism and the threat to global biodiversity. It also notes
positive effects. Part III briefly summarizes the two most prevalent viewpoints
on how to best address the phenomenon of bioprospecting, which consist of de-
veloping an international or transnational sui generis system and amending the
United States patent code. Then, Part IV attempts to reframe the bioprospecting
debate. It analyzes bioprospecting through a global lens, giving emphasis to in-
ternational competitive efforts, embedded globalization, and the response of
concerned citizens. Finally, it proposes a legal solution that attempts to harmo-
nize these global themes with the underlying issues of bioprospecting.
2. See Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric of Biopiracy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 519, 520-23
(2003).
3. See International Monetary Fund, Globalization: Threat or Opportunity?-What is Global-
ization (Apr. 12, 2000), http'//www.imf.org/externaVnp/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm #11.
4. See lost Delbrtick, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domestic
Law--A European Perspective, I IND. J. GLOBAL LECAL STUD. 9, 11 (1993).
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I. THE GLOBAL PHENOMENON OF BIOPROSPECTING
As this section demonstrates, bioprospecting, or biopiracy, begins when firms
from developed countries interact with indigenous cultures in developing coun-
tries. The firms learn the "traditional knowledge" of these cultures, and then ap-
propriate that knowledge under the developed country's intellectual property laws.
"Traditional knowledge" is defined by one commentator "by its general char-
acteristics: creation through a long period of time which has been passed down
from generation to generation; new knowledge is integrated to the existing, as
knowledge is improved; improvement and creation of knowledge is a group effort;
and ownership of indigenous knowledge varies between indigenous peoples."' For
example, traditional knowledge that is often sought by nonindigenous entities in-
cludes the use of plants as medicine or insecticides;7 this knowledge has often ex-
isted for generations in the relevant indigenous group before being learned by
outside entities. Once outsiders appropriate this knowledge, it is then formatted to
fit a particular nation's intellectual property laws.8 Firms can then argue for broad
international protection of this knowledge, such as protection through the World
Trade Organization's (WTO) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) agreement.9 As suggested by the following three examples, the mo-
nopoly protection of patents bars indigenous peoples that have ma-de use of tradi-
tional knowledge for generations from freely continuing to use that knowledge.
5. See, e.g., SHIVA, supra note I, at 49; see also Marden, supra note 1, at 279.
6. Miriam Latorre Quinn, Protection for Indigenous Knowledge: An International Law Analysis, 14
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 287,292 (2001). See generally Sarah Harding, Defining TraditionalKnowledge-
Lessonsfiom Cultural Property, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 511 (2003) (comparing "traditional
knowledge" to "cultural property").
7. See Marden,supra note 1, at 283 (discussing the various indigenous uses of the neem tree); see
also Quinn, supra note 6, at 290-92 (listing other popular examples).
8. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-
Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 11,20,26-27 (1998).
9. Id. at 20; see Gerard Bodeker, Traditional Medical Knowledge, Intellectual Property Rights &
Benefit Sharing, II CARDOZO J. INT'L & Comp. L. 785, 790 (2003). The international agreements
under which firms claim these broad rights are discussed below in Part III.A.1.
10. See generally Shubha Ghosh, Reflections on the Traditional Knowledge Debate, 11 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 497 (2003) (discussing three basic arguments for and against intellectual property
protection of traditional knowledge: the public domain position, the appropriation position, and the
moral rights position); Silke von Lewinski, The Protection of Folklore, II CAWOZO J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 747 (2003) (giving a general overview of some modern issues regarding traditional knowledge).
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The appropriation of traditional knowledge has broad ramifications, espe-
cially with regard to copyrights and patents." However, while the copyrighting
of traditional folklore and oral heritages is worth exploring further, this Note's
discussion is limited to the patenting of traditional knowledge as that knowl-
edge is applied to biotechnology.' 2 For purposes of this Note, "biotechnology" is
understood as defined in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).3 The
CBD defines biotechnology as "any technological application that uses biologi-
cal systems, living organisms, or derivates thereof, to make or modify products
or processes for specific use. '""
Three popular examples give reality to the phenomenon of bioprospecting:
the neem tree, the turmeric plant, and basmati rice.'" Each of these bioresources
originates in India, and each has been used for its respective purpose for genera-
tions. ' In the case of the neem tree, 17 W.R. Grace and Company recently ob-
tained U.S. patents over several neem-based products. 8 Because neem-based
products are and have been common in India for some time, these patents have
become a rallying point against what is viewed as Western imperialism toward
Indian culture, although in this particular case there seems to be no risk of
11. See infra Part II.
12. While naturally occurring products are not patentable, modifications thereof are patentable
in the United States. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). For present purposes, I am
assuming that such patents generally can be acquired legitimately in the country of application.
For example, while 35 U.S.C. § 102(0 may pose particular difficulties, it is assumed that this stat-
ute is and can be legitimately avoided. See the basmati rice example, infia p. 5.
13. E.g., Marden,supra note 1, at 279 n.1.
14. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 2, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 822.
15. Quinn, supra note 6, at 290-92 (outlining these, among other, examples). See generally
Graeme W. Austin, Re-Treating Intellectual Property? The WA! 262 Proceeding and the Heuristics of
Intellectual Property Law, II CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 333 (2003) (discussing the rights of
Maori under Te Tiriti o Waitangi); Christine Toomey, Gene Pirates Bleed Indians for AIDS Cure,
TIMEs (London), June 4, 1995 (describing the involvement of multinational corporations in India
attempting to collect blood from Indians).
16. Quinn, supra note 6, at 290-91.
17. Neem has been known and utilized by indigenous Indian cultures since the days of Sanskrit
and has a variety of local uses, although its uses as a medicine and an insecticide are the most popu-
lar. See Marden, supra note 1, at 283.
18. Id. at 283-84.
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adverse socioeconomic effects on the Indian people. 9 Examples similar to the
neem tree are numerous.
20
As the case of the turmeric plant demonstrates, not all such patents go le-
gally unchallenged.21 In 1996, the Indian Council for Scientific and Industrial
Research (CSIR) successfully challenged and overturned two U.S. patents cover-
ing a method (long known to people indigenous to India) for administering tur-
meric to wounds for healing.22 The United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) ruled the patents were anticipated and obvious when the CSIR demon-
strated thirty-two prior written references, some in ancient Sanskrit.
23
Although the threat of patent invalidation, such as occurred with the tur-
meric plant,24 may deter relatively unsophisticated patentees, for more sophisti-
cated entities these threats are most likely hollow. 25 For example, RiceTec, a
Texas-based corporation, 26 recently obtained a patent on basmati rice-a grain
produced in India at a rate of 650,000 tons annually. 27 Unlike the turmeric
patent, however, the basmati rice patent crossbreeds the Indian plant with other
19. Id. at 285-86. But see Shayana Kadidal, Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiverisity, Foreign
PriorArt and the Neem Patent Controversy, 37 IDEA 371,376-78 (1997) (arguing that W.R. Grace's
neem-based patents could drive up seed prices everywhere and deny indigenous Indian compa-
nies access to the U.S. market, which could possibly be the largest and most lucrative). Issues of
neocolonialism are discussed further in Part II.A.
20. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 6, at 290-92 (also noting cases involving karela juice, quinoa
vegetables, periwinkle plants, ayahuasca plants, and the Maytenus buchananii plant).
21. See, e.g., id. at 290.
22. Id.; Eliana Torelly de Carvalho, Protection of Taditional Biodiversity-Related Knowledge:
Analysis of Proposals for the Adoption of a Sui Generis System, II Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 38, 65
(2003).
23. De Carvalho, supra note 22, at 65. As a point of general overview, the United States patent
code disallows all patent applications that are deemed either "anticipated" (that is, prior art-e.g.,
earlier patents or other references that already explain the applicant's desired claims) or "obvious"
(that is, the applicant does not genuinely claim anything novel for patenting purposes, or the ap-
plication simply claims a naturally occurring or existing product). See generally 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2000). With regard to foreign prior art, the U.S. patent code clearly-and controversially-
requires the foreign prior art to exist in written form for it to anticipate a claim on a later applica-
tion. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). For a discussion of extending the reach of U.S. patents into the
international arena, see Part III.A.I.
24. See Quinn, supra note 6, at 290.
25. Cf id. at 290-91 (noting the inability to cancel patents on basmati rice and periwinkle plants,
both of which are owned by large U.S. companies).
26. See K.S. Jayaramen, India to challenge basmati rice "invention", NATURE, Feb. 19, 1999, at 728.
27. Quinn, supra note 6, at 290.
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varieties. 2 This creates a novel and nonnatural product for U.S. patent pur-
poses. 29 Such a product perhaps represents the most threatening means for un-
dermining traditional knowledge as a bar to patentability, as international
agreements such as TRIPS may allow the newly patented products to then be
enforced against indigenous cultures."'
II. GLOBAL EFFECTS OF BIOPROSPECTING
The effects of bioprospecting extend beyond the local communities that were
the original holders of the traditional knowledge. Bioprospecting can have a neg-
ative financial impact on indigenous peoples, as international agreements allow
U.S. patent holders to exercise their monopoly protection against indigenous per-
sons in the United States as well as foreign markets.3' As discussed below in Sub-
parts A and B, the negative impacts of biodiversity can also include threats to
cultural identity 2 and environmental resources.33 However, commentators also
have noted positive effects of bioprospecting, as addressed in Subpart C.34
A. Neocolonialism
Neocolonialism is intricately linked to bioprospecting." Typically, corpora-
tions from developed nations, usually from the northern hemisphere, under
Western ideas of property ownership3 6 and intellectual property laws,37 appro-
priate biodiversity from developing nations.3' These corporations act under the
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (upholding the validity of a patent for
a nonnatural, genetically engineered oil-eating bacterium).
30. See Aoki, supra note 8, at 20, 26-27; Kadidal, supra note 19, at 376-78. See also infra Part
III.A.1.
31. See Aoki,supra note 8, at 20, 26-27; see also Kadidal,supra note 19, at 376-78.
32. See infra Part II.A.
33. See infra Part II.B.
34. See infra Part II.C.
35. See SHIvA, supra note 1, at 49.
36. See Remigius N. Nwabueze, Ethnopharmacology, Patents and the Politics of Plants' Genetic
Resources, II CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 585, 621 (2003) ("Possessive individualism conceptually
defines and identifies an individual by the property he or she possesses. It is a Western concept and
provides the theoretical underpinning of patent, copyright, and suigeneris protections. It is episte-
mologically unsuitable for community or collective property ..." (citations omitted)).
37. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
38. See supra Part I.
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assumption that it is their natural right to take these resources.39 As one com-
mentator notes:
The freedom that transnational corporations are claiming
through intellectual property rights protection in the GATT
agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights... is the
freedom that European colonizers have claimed since 1492. Co-
lumbus set a precedent when he treated the license to conquer
non-European peoples as a natural right of European men. The
land titles issued by the pope through European kings and queens
were the first patents.... Eurocentric notions of property and pi-
racy are the bases on which the [intellectual property] laws of the
GATT and World Trade Organization ... have been framed.
When Europeans first colonized the non-European world, they
felt it was their duty to "discover and conquer," to "subdue, oc-
cupy, and possess[" ... everything, every society, every culture.
The colonies have now been extended to the interior spaces, the
"genetic codes" of life-forms from microbes and plants to animals,
including humans.... The assumption of empty lands... is now
being expanded to "empty life," seeds and medicinal
plants.... The same logic is now used to appropriate biodiversity
from the original owners and innovators by defining their seeds,
medicinal plants, and medical knowledge as nature, as non-
science, and treating the tools of genetic engineering as the yard-
stick of "improvement.". . . At the heart of the GATT treaty and
its patent laws is the treatment of biopiracy as a natural right of
Western corporations, necessary for the "development" of Third
World communities. 40
This neocolonialism takes advantage of and abuses aboriginal cultures by
stripping them of their ability to participate fully in markets available for their
knowledge and skills. 4' For example, W.R. Grace's neem-based patents give it
control over all such products in, at least, the U.S. market, potentially denying
39. See VANDANA SHIVA, BiopiRAcy: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 2-5 (1997).
40. Id.
41. See Kadidal,supra note 19, at 376-78; Marden,supra note 1, at 280.
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indigenous Indian companies what could otherwise be their largest and most lu-
crative market. 4' Thus, the indigenous peoples and companies could be pre-
vented from applying their knowledge and skills to the capitalist systems
dominating the world economy. 43 Further, because of their established economic
dominance, the northern nations are able to impose their ideologies into inter-
national agreements relatively easily.44 This neocolonialism perpetuates the
North-South divide, as typically none of the profits made by the multinational
companies return to the states or peoples of origination.
45
B. Loss of Global Biodiversity
In addition to the problem of neocolonialism, it is generally agreed that the
threat of losing the world's biodiversity is growing. 46 Biodiversity is important
for at least two reasons. 47 First, it is an "ecological theorem" that ecosystems that
are more diverse are less vulnerable to destruction.41 Second, the loss ofbiodiver-
sity means the loss of genetic information. 49 The loss of genetic information, in
turn, may result in the loss of "useful templates"-for example, DNA-that
may hold keys to medicinal progress.'0 Bioprospecting may threaten biodiversity
in that it leads to the "overuse"-that is, widespread gathering to the point of de-
pletion-of particular bioresources.
5 1
Further, bioprospecting may punish indigenous cultures at the interface
with vast regions of biodiversity. 2 These cultures are open about traditional
42. Kadidal,supra note 19, at 376-78. Butsee Marden,supra note 1, at 285-86 (discussing the ex-
tremely unlikely event that W.R. Grace's neem-based patents will actually affect indigenous Indi-
ans either socially or economically).
43. See SHIVA, supra note 1, at 66-68.
44. See, e.g., AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS
ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 232 (2003); Jeffrey P. Kushan, Biodiversity: Opportunities
and Obligations, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 755, 757-58 (1995).
45. E.g., Marden, supra note 1, at 280. This statement is not true across the board, however. See
Heald, supra note 2, at 535.
46. See, e.g., VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stabinsky eds., 1996).
47. Clifford S. Russell, Two Propositions About Biodiversity, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 690
(1995).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 690-91.
51. See Ehsan Masood, Medicinal Plants Threatened by Over-use, NATURE, Feb. 13, 1997, at 570.
52. See SHIvA, supra note 1, at 48.
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knowledge of bioresources only to have that knowledge monopolized to their
detriment (or at least lack of benefit).53 Multinational firms rarely share the prof-
its they gain from bioprospecting. 4 As will be discussed below, profit sharing
with indigenous peoples could provide an economic incentive for them to pro-
tect what biodiversity they can.5" Such incentives would encourage indigenous
persons to engage in preservation without wholly denying bioprospecting ef-
forts.5" Hence, those who are most familiar with the relevant ecological systems
would be placed in a situation of active preservation to ensure minimal and con-
trolled intrusion on their adjacent ecological systems. 5 7
C. Positive Effects of Bioprospecting
Despite the serious concerns of neocolonialism and loss of biodiversity, there
also may be significant positive effects of bioprospecting." Bioprospecting allows
those who are in the best economic position to disseminate valuable information to
do so uninhibited.59 For example, as many as four-fifths of all drugs have their basis
in natural plant resources.6" Hence, this use of broad intellectual property protec-
tion may increase the likelihood of finding and distributing medicinal cures.61
Such cures could especially improve quality of life for indigenous persons.6 2
53. See Aoki,supra note 8, at 20, 26-27; Kadidal,supra note 19, at 376-78.
54. See Marden, supra note 1, at 280. But see Heald, supra note 2, at 535.
55. See Daniel M. Bodansky, The Meaning of Biological Diversity: International Law and the Pro-
tection of Biological Diversity, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 623, 626-27 (1995); Rosemary J. Coombe,
The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' and Community Traditional Knowledge in International Law,
14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275, 280-82 (2001). See generally Russell, supra note 47 (analyzing benefits
of biodiversity, harm from its losses, and solutions to protecting it, including providing economic
incentives to local peoples).
56. See Russell, supra note 47, at 692.
57. Seeid.
58. See generally Heald,supra note 2 (outlining positive effects of bioprospecting, including the
potential for finding medicinal cures and protecting biogenetic resources, and negative effects of
regulation, including increasing the scope of already broad intellectual property rights and in-
creasing transaction costs and the potential for government corruption).
59. See id. at 531-32.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Cf Russel Lawrence Barsh, Pharmacogenomics and Indigenous Peoples: Real Issues and Actors,
11 CARDOZO, J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 365, 366 (2003) (suggesting that the only injustice brought against
indigenous persons by bioprospecting is the failure to focus genetic research on the health and sur-
vival of indigenous persons themselves).
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In addition, it can be argued that bioprospecting breaks down the North-
South divide, which tends to separate developed and undeveloped countries,
and establishes incentives to preserve the world's biodiversity. Bioprospecting
creates economic incentives for large and wealthy businesses to invest in protect-
ing the world's biodiversity to assure that valuable resources are not lost.63 Fur-
ther, knowing that bioresources in themselves may be valuable to developed
nations, southern nations may be able to establish a system of protection for do-
mestic resources.6 This system of protection could dramatically increase south-
ern bargaining power and help dissolve the North-South divide.65
III. ADDRESSING THE GLOBAL EFFECTS OF BIOPROSPECTING
The vast majority of commentators on bioprospecting seek to find solutions
to the abovementioned effects of neocolonialism and loss of global biodiversity.
The two most prevalent proposals are creating sui generis systems to operate be-
tween governments and the for-profit organizations interested in bioprospect-
ing, and amending U.S. patent law.66 As shown below, although neither of these
63. See Heald, supra note 2, at 532-34.
64. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 316-17 (3d ed. 2003).
65. See generally Craig Allen Nard, In Defense of Geographic Disparity, 88 MINN. L. REV. 222,
232-34 (2003) (discussing the compensation agreement reached by Merck, a transnational phar-
maceutical company, and INBio, a Costa Rican nonprofit conservation institute).
66. Although these two positions are the most prevalent, they are not the totality of positions
available. See generally Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds and Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, II
CARDOZO J. INT'L & ComP. L. 247 (2003) (arguing for a "limited commons" approach to address
problems presented by intellectual property protection of traditional knowledge); Margo A.
Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World, 87
MINN. L. REV. 679 (2003) (arguing that the geographical limitation of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) under-
mines the basic constitutional authority to grant patents only to actual inventors); David R.
Downes, How Intellectual Property Could be a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge, 25 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 253 (2000) (outlining five ways intellectual property rights can be used to protect tradi-
tional knowledge); Curtis M. Horton, Protecting Biodiversity and Cultural Diversity Under Intellec-
tual Property Law: Toward a New International System, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1 (1995) (arguing
for an approach utilizing intellectual property law, property law, contract law, and politics to pro-
tect traditional knowledge); Robert K. Paterson & Dennis S. Karjala, Looking Beyond Intellectual
Property in Resolving Protection of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, 11
CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 633 (2003) (arguing that application of trademark law would best
serve the interests of indigenous persons while also protecting the modern creative spirit); Gelvina
Rodriguez Stevenson, Note, Trade Secrets: The Secret to Protecting Indigenous Ethnobiological
(Medicinal) Knowledge, 32 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1119 (2000) (arguing that indigenous persons
may find protection from Western intellectual property laws in trade secret law).
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proposed solutions alone may be completely effective, their combined efforts
may yield a favorable solution.
A. Sui Generis Systems
A popular proposal to prevent the negative effects of bioprospecting is the
creation of a sui generis system between governments of developing countries
and for-profit organizations seeking the bioresources of those countries.67 Such
systems usually take one of two forms: involvement by intergovernmental agen-
cies or local governments-the approach taken by the WTO, the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (WIPO), and India-or the promotion of
reciprocal, profit-sharing techniques between multinational corporations and
the indigenous cultures in question-an approach popularized in Costa Rica.68
These systems can be established through contracts, legislation, or an expanded
understanding of human rights. 69 However, practical considerations may result
in the long-term failure of these systems.
7°
1. In General
Arguments favoring involvement by governmental bodies note several po-
tential benefits, whether they involve intergovernmental agencies, such as the
WTO or WIPO, or internal legislative acts, such as those found in India.7' These
benefits include an emphasis on the commonly held indigenous perspective that
communal rights underlie traditional knowledge72 and an opportunity for in-
creased access to traditional knowledge.73 Other commentators note that even
67. See generally Ong Chui Koon, Intellectual Property Protection of Traditional Medicine and
Treatments in Malaysia, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS-
PECTS OF ETHNOBIOLOGY 153, 172 (Michael Blakeney ed., 1999) ("A sui generis system appears to be
the most appropriate scheme for the protection of traditional medicine and other treatments.");
De Carvalho, supra note 22, at 59-64 (reviewing some sui generis systems and the CBD).
68. See, e.g., De Carvalho, supra note 22, at 59-61.
69. Part III.A.1-3.
70. See infra Part III.A.4.
71. E.g., Weerawit Weeraworawit, Formulating an International Legal Protection for Genetic Re-
sources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: Challenges for the Intellectual Property System, 11
CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 769-71 (2003).
72. Id. at 773.
73. See id. at 776-78 (suggesting that an internationally uniform interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement could aid in the access to and identification of the origin of traditional knowledge and
genetic resources).
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where an intergovernmental agreement does not have the force of law in the rel-
evant country,74 its "spirit and substance" should be adopted as such.75
Arguments favoring sui generis systems that require profit sharing between
multinational corporations and indigenous cultures-a method adopted in
Costa Rica-also have potential benefits. 76 As one commentator notes:
ITIhere could be a sui generis system derived from this intellec-
tual property system that would fit the needs of the indigenous
peoples.... Pharmaceutical corporations seeking to develop tech-
nology based on indigenous knowledge would still benefit...
however, the economic benefits and the credit for the source
should be awarded justly. In addition, the safeguards on biodiver-
sity[] would further protect the disappearance of plant variety that
threaten[s] the world community. It is important after all to recog-
nize that nature and its derivatives are for the community to en-
joy, not just for a few who can afford it.77
Such a sui generis system could protect worldwide cultures from the loss of
global biodiversity. 8 It also could help eliminate the North-South divide by re-
quiring northern industries to pay adequate compensation to southern peoples for
exploitation of the South's genetic resources.79 Establishment of these sui generis
systems can be through acts of intergovernmental agencies, local "sword and
74. Such as the CBD in the United States. De Carvalho,supra note 22, at 59.
75. Edgar J. Asebey & Jill D. Kempenaar, Biodiversity Prospecting: Fulfilling the Mandate of the
Biodiversity Convention, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 703, 748, 754 (1995); see Lee A. Kimball, The
Biodiversity Convention: How to Make it Work, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 763, 765 (1995); Cathe-
rine Tinker, Responsibility for Biological Diversity Compensation Under International Law, 28 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 777, 780 (1995); W. Robert Ward, Man or Beast: The Convention on Biological Di-
versity and the Emerging Law of Sustainable Development, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 823, 827-28
(1995).
76. E.g., Nard,supra note 65, at 232-34. Cf SHIvA, supra note 1, at 64 ("Benefit sharing.., is the
equivalent of stealing a loaf of bread and then sharing the crumbs.").
77. Quinn,supra note 6, at 313.
78. See, e.g., Nwabueze, supra note 36, at 625 (discussing the compensation agreement reached
by Merck, a transnational pharmaceutical company, and INBio, a Costa Rican nonprofit conser-
vation institute).
79. See, e.g., id.
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shield" legislation-acts that seek to protect local interests while also defeating
outside exploitation of those interests8°-or government-corporate contracts81
2. Intergovernmental Agencies
The WTO and WIPO are leading intergovernmental actors in the intellec-
tual property arena. The WTO is the major international force behind the protec-
tion of patent rights beyond the issuing nation's own borders.8 2 The WTO has
instituted the TRIPS agreement as a component of its more general international
agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).83 The TRIPS
agreement has been criticized for its role in perpetuating bioprospecting and its
abuses.84 While the WTO recently has sought to review these problems,85 TRIPS
does not confer rights upon traditional knowledge or genetic resources. 6 Rather,
many of TRIPS's provisions are open to interpretation by the Member States as to
the scope of any remedial or preventative nature.87 As one scholar notes:
The TRIPS Agreement is silent on traditional knowledge, ge-
netic resources, folklore and biodiversity. However, it has certain
provisions that could be interpreted in favour of the concept of
transfer of technology and access. Article 7 stipulates the objectives
of the Agreement that "Itihe protection and enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of tech-
nological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations." Ar-
ticle 8 stipulates the principles that include the prevention against
80. See Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An Intellec-
tual Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REc. 229, 263 (1998).
81. See id. at 263-79; Rekha Ramani, Note, Market Realities v. Indigenous Equities, 26 BROOKLYN
J. INT'L L. 1147, 1161-64 (2001). An example from Costa Rica is noted infr-a at 659-61.
82. See Bodeker, supra note 9, at 790.
83. See Aoki,supra note 8, at 15-16.
84. See id. at 15-21.
85. See Bodeker, supra note 9, at 790-93; see also The WTO's Website, Article 27.3b, Traditional
Knowledge, Biodiversity, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips_.e/art 2 7_3b-e.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2005) [hereinafter WTO Website].
86. Weeraworawit, supra note 71, at 777.
87. See id. at 776-77.
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the abuse of intellectual property rights or restrictive practices.
These provisions are broad and subjected to ... interpretation by
the Member states. They provide the safeguard, but not the pro-
tection for traditional knowledge, genetic resources, or folklore
directly. The same thing could be said about Article 27.2 on the
exclusion from patentability on the ground of public order or mo-
rality, including prejudice to the environment. They could be
used to prevent ... unfair or abusive exploitation of genetic re-
sources, but they do not confer legal protection to traditional
knowledge or genetic resources. Article 67 deals with technical
cooperation from the developed countries to the developing and
least developed countries. It also refers to assistance in the preven-
tion against abuse."8
The allowance for Member States to adopt their own remedial or preventa-
tive solution is more explicitly acknowledged in article 27.3(b) of TRIPS, which
allows "for the protection of plant varieties either by patents, by an effective sui
generis system or by any combination thereof."89 This specific article is currently
being considered by the WTO for expansion or harmonization with the CBD.9°
As sui generis systems are uniquely developed by a country or region according
to that country's or region's needs," the TRIPS component of GATT authorizes
countries or regions to apply their individual solutions to bioprospecting prob-
lems; however, the general view under TRIPS is that traditional knowledge is a
part of a "global commons available for exploitation by all."92
WIPO, a specialized agency of the United Nations, also has recently visited
the bioprospecting issue. 3 However, the results of WIPO's recent discussions on
the issue are inconclusive: On the one hand, WIPO's consideration of the bio-
prospecting issue is a clear indication of the issue's importance; on the other
hand, it is also clear that many countries remain unconvinced as to whether, or
88. Id.
89. Bodeker, supra note 9, at 790 (quoting art. 27.3(b)).
90. See id. at 791-92; see also WTO Website, supra note 85.
91. Bodeker, supra note 9, at 790.
92. Id.
93. See Weeraworawit, supra note 71, at 770; see also The WIPO's Website, Intergoveynmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore 2
(2005), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo-grtkf ic-8/wipo-grtkf ic-8-decisions.pdf
[hereinafter WIPO Websitel.
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how, to change the international patent regime.94 The leading proposal for ad-
dressing bioprospecting under the auspices of WIPO seems likely to be a varia-
tion of the Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions
of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions (Model
Provisions).9" Although the Model Provisions are based on the protection of tra-
ditional folklore from foreign copyrights, the framework may be applicable to
bioprospecting. 6 However, the criminal and civil penalties under the Model
Provisions are, like the laws that allow for bioprospecting to begin with, West-
ern in origin, perhaps perpetuating North-South issues.9 7 Specifically, the folk-
lore protection provided by the Model Provisions is based on an adaptation of
Western copyright law-a law which itself is accused by indigenous persons as
being the source of the problems.98 This adaptation shifts ownership in the folk-
lore from a creating individual to an individual authorized to license the use of
the folklore.99 However, this solution still misses the communal property mind-
set pervasive among indigenous cultures in these matters.
0 0
3. Local Legislation
India and Costa Rica have taken different approaches to internal sui generis
responses and solutions. India has enacted several "sword-and-shield" attempts
to curb bioprospecting efforts and protect its traditional knowledge, while Costa
Rica has sought a profit-sharing technique with bioprospecting companies. One
of India's legislative acts punishes those who apply for a patent in India that is
based on Indian bioresources with up to five years in prison and up to a $30,000
fine. °1' Because indigenous persons are unlikely to seek such a patent, the broad
language in the law seems unlikely to ever apply to them. Similar measures have
94. See Weeraworawit, supra note 71, at 778; see also WIPO Website, supra note 93, at 2.
95. See Nwabueze, supra note 36, at 620; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against
Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions (1985), available at http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/
documents/pdf/1982-folklore-model-provisions.pdf [hereinafter Model Provisions].
96. Nwabueze, supra note 36, at 620.
97. See id. at 620-21. With regard to the Model Provisions' criminal and civil penalties, these are
left open for precise definition by an enacting country. See Model Provisions, supra note 95, 20,
25, §§ 6-8.
98. Nwabueze, supra note 36, at 621.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. K.S. Jayaraman, India Drafts Law to Protect Bioresources, NATURE, Nov. 13, 1997, at 108.
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been enacted in other countries.' 2 Other Indian legislation is purely defensive.'
For example, India recently took affirmative steps toward the creation of a dig-
ital library of traditional knowledge in an attempt to preempt applicants for U.S.
patents by creating a published foreign use, undermining any assertions that a
patent application meets the United States' novelty requirement."° Some of this
information is being published in up to six languages. 11 5 However, while such
databases may operate effectively to preempt the patentability of certain subject
matter,10 ' they may ultimately be nothing more than a fast track to biopiracy for
more sophisticated firms capable of making technical alterations to recorded in-
formation for purposes of patentability.
0 7
The Costa Rican sui generis system is a compensation-based model, unlike
the "sword-and-shield" approach taken in India. A popular example is the 1991
agreement between the Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad (INBio), a private,
nonprofit Costa Rican conservation organization, and Merck, a U.S.-based mul-
tinational pharmaceutical company.' Under this agreement:
INBio initially supplied Merck with ten thousand biosamples or
extracts from wild plants, insects and micro-organisms for a con-
sideration of 1.135 million dollars (U.S.). One million dollars was
paid up-front in cash, while $135,000 represented the value of sci-
entific equipment supplied to INBio by Merck. Under the con-
tract INBio would, in addition, be paid Ia] certain percentage of
the royalties resulting from any commercialization of the re-
102. See, e.g., De Carvalho,supra note 22, at 44-47 (discussing measures taken in Costa Rica, Bra-
zil, and Australia). See generally Justice Ronald Sackville, Legal Protection of Indigenous Culture in
Australia, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 711 (2003) (discussing the slow but positive changes in
Australian law favoring indigenous heritage).
103. See India: CSIR Chief Stress on Non-Patent Database, Bus. LINE, Sept. 23, 2000.
104. See India: CSIR Files 200 Patents Abroad, Bus. LINE, Nov. 3, 2000. The U.S.'s published
foreign-use bar is codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
105. India to Publish Ayruvedic Tracts on the Internet in Six Languages, NUTRACEUTICALS INT'L,
May 1, 2002.
106. See generally Ikechi Mgbeoji, Patents and Traditional Knowledge of the Uses of Plants: Is a
Communal Patent Regime Part of the Solution to the Scourge of Bio Piracy?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 163 (2001) (arguing for the creation of national registries of traditional knowledge).
107. See Bodeker,supra note 9, at 803-05. See also the basmati rice example,supra at 649-50.
108. See Nwabueze, supra note 36, at 625;see also Nard, supra note 65, at 232-34.
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sources it supplied. The money realized by INBio would be ap-
plied to conservation efforts, training and capacity-building. °9
Such agreements allow for at least some flow of proceeds from products devel-
oped through bioprospecting to return to the country of origin.
Sui generis systems may find moral justification in a human rights analy-
sis.' As one commentator notes, "protecting traditional knowledge cannot be
achieved without also upholding the individual and collective human rights of
traditional knowledge holders and their communities."'.. This expansion of
human rights could naturally lead to a system of reciprocal compensation be-
tween the profiting firm and either the indigenous peoples or their host coun-
try.'"2 Expansion of human rights may also lead to a long-term resolution to the
bioprospecting problem, but this expanded understanding is unlikely to occur
on a sufficiently broad scale in a relatively short time frame." 3
4. Problems with Sui Generis Systems
Sui generis systems between local governments and multinational, for-
profit organizations generally cannot be implemented as currently proposed
without concern for their long-term stability. In some cases, proposed resolution
of issues may not be truly obligatory."4 In other cases, the sui generis system may
not be truly effective."' For example, a critical concern underlying many inter-
national or transnational sui generis systems is identifying a court in which these
109. Nwabueze, supra note 36, at 625.
110. See Graham Dutfield, Protecting and Revitalizing Traditional Ecological Knowledge: Intellec-
tual Property Rights and Community Knowledge Databases in India, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY As-
PECTS OF ETHNOBIOLOCY 101, 121 (Michael Blakeney ed., 1999). See generally Rosemary J. Coombe,
Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the
Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 59 (1998) (analyzing intellectual property rights from an international human rights view).
111. Dutfield,supmn note 110, at 121.
112. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and Tech-
nical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INr'L L. 919,951-53 (1996). The
InBio-Merck agreement is an example of a firm-country agreement, although that agreement
was based on environmental protection rather than human rights.
113. See Heald, supra note 2, at 522-27.
114. See De Carvalho, supra note 22, at 59.
115. See Chris Farrands, The Globalization of Knowledge and the Politics of Global Intellectual
Property: Powe; Governance and Technology, in GLOBALIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 175, 184
(Eleonore Kofman & Gillian Youngs eds., 1996).
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systems can be enforced." 6 However, even where obligatory enforcement proce-
dures may be clear, they may still prove questionable in their effectiveness." 7 For
example, WTO arbitration under TRIPS, while obligatory, is somewhat depen-
dent on the bargaining power of the countries in question."' If the two parties to
a dispute are the United States and Madagascar," 9 for example, bargaining
power is unlikely to be equal, and the U.S.-based corporations that are the
source of the dispute may be able to economically justify a breach of contract or
other failure to adhere to Madagascar's demands. 12 So long as this disparity in
bargaining power exists, a permanent effective solution is unlikely.' 2'
In addition, although agreements such as the INBio-Merck agreement
allow for some of the proceeds to return to the country of origin, it is likely that
these proceeds are nominal compared to the bioprospecting company's profits.
22
Also, such agreements do not necessarily address the exclusion of indigenous
persons from capitalist markets.
B. Amending U.S. Patent Law-The Long Term Solution
The primary policy of U.S. patent law is to protect the inventor of a "new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter"; 123 thus,
patents such as the basmati rice patent are squarely within the policies of U.S.
116. See id.
117. See A. Claire Cutler, Private International Regimes and Inteifrm Cooperation, in THE EMER-
GENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23, 31 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J.
Biersteker eds., 2002); see also Ronnie D. Lipschutz & Cathleen Fogel, "Regulation for the Rest of
Us?": Global Civil Society and the Privatization of Transnational Regulation, in THE EMERGENCE OF
PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 115, 116 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker
eds., 2002) (noting other systemic problems with WTO arbitration).
118. See Cutler,supra note 117, at 3 1.
119. These two countries were not chosen arbitrarily. See generally Quinn, supra note 6, at 291
(discussing the Periwinkle case).
120. See Cutler, supra note 117, at 31.
121. Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 2
(2001) ("[I]n order for traditional knowledge to be protected effectively either within the prevail-
ing intellectual property regime or by a separate regime, the bargaining power of developing
countries must be strengthened."); see also Michael H. Davis, Some Realism About Indigenism, 11
CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 815, 829-30 (2003) (arguing for the need to establish a system of com-
petitive wealth).
122. Cf. SHIvA, supra note 1, at 64.
123. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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patent law. 124 In response to this broad policy, many commentators suggest
amending U.S. patent law to reflect sensitivity toward developing nations and
peoples in cases of bioprospecting. 125 To effectuate this increased sensitivity, the
United States Congress or courts could adopt moral rights, 126 or Congress could
recognize unpublished foreign prior use as a bar to patentability.' 27 Also, Con-
gress could seek to increase international harmonization among intellectual
property rights, for example by increasing conformity to the CBD. 12' Finally,
Congress could propose legislation to encourage INBio-Merck-type agree-
ments, increasing benefits sharing in an attempt to make developing countries
willing partners in utilizing bioresources. 129 Such legislation, perhaps, could cre-
ate an exception to patentability for any traditional-knowledge-based patents-
such as W.R. Grace's neem-based patents-that are secured without such an
agreement.1
30
124. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
125. See generally Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and
African Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 399 (2004) ("Based on
our analysis, the United States could make changes in both its domestic and foreign policies that
would improve developing-country access to the patented tools of biotechnology while preserving
the core invention incentives of the patent system."); Traci L. McClellan, Note, The Role of Inter-
national Law in Protecting the Traditional Knowledge and Plant Life of Indigenous Peoples, 19 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 249, 265-66 (2001) ("However, indigenous leaders and advocates for indigenous peoples
have called on the PTO to change its rules and develop a system to prevent the patenting of in-
digenous peoples' intellectual property rights in the future. This type of action should be taken by
all nation-states who have yet to draft laws and policies putting their country in step with current
international law.").
126. E.g., Leanne M. Fecteau, Note, The Ayahuasca Patent Revocation: Raising Questions About
Current U.S. Patent Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 69, 87-95 (2001) (discussing, inter alia, legis-
lative and common law expansion of the utility requirement to include the "good morals of soci-
ety" (quoting Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1817)
(No. 8,568))). Moral rights are a popular requisite for some intellectual property protection outside
of the United States. See MERCES, supra note 64, at 443.
127. E.g., Fecteau, supra note 126, at 95-98 (arguing that Congress ought to reconsider 35 U.S.C.
§ 102, the patent novelty requirement, so that the statute's geographic limitation is eliminated and
foreign prior use in the form of traditional knowledge is recognized as prior art). See generally
William LaMarca, Reevaluating the Geographical Limitation of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b); Policies Consid-
ered, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 25 (1996) (discussing the historical justifications of§ 102(b)).
128. See, e.g., Fecteau, supra note 126, at 99-102 (arguing that TRIPS should be harmonized with
the CBD by putting forth an amendment that seeks to protect communal intellectual property).
129. See, e.g., Russell,supra note 47, at 692 (discussing how agreements between developing coun-
tries and bioprospecting firms create incentives that encourage biological preservation).
130. Cf. Fecteau, supra note 126, at 95-98 (discussing reasons for amending the patent novelty re-
quirement).
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Each of these proposals raises some concerns. The United States has actively
chosen to not adopt moral rights or other policies common outside the United
States and reflected in international systems, such as a first-to-file system."'
Also, altering the policies of the United States may result in losing the positive
effects that bioprospecting stands to offer, especially if amendments to the U.S.
patent code change longstanding U.S. policies too drastically.
13 2
While an amendment to the U.S. patent code could be a stable long-term so-
lution, any amendment likely to drastically change longstanding U.S. policies
would require a lengthy amount of time to gain approval. 33 As such, this solu-
tion is untenable in the short term. 34 So long as the United States and other
northern nations are economically ahead of the rest of the world in their intellec-
tual property law systems,135 these nations are unlikely to make changes that
would negatively affect their competitive advantage.36
IV. LOCAL RESPONSES TO GLOBALIZATION
The current rhetoric in the bioprospecting debate is inadequate to accom-
plish the goals of many commentators on this subject, most notably because of
the problems with sui generis systems and the lack of appeal to either Congress
or U.S.-based businesses in amending U.S. patent law.13 7 While sui generis sys-
tems are unlikely to be effective permanent solutions, 38 they may be sufficient
until amendments to the U.S. patent system gain favor.139 Still, it is conceded that
131. See MERGES, SUpra note 64, at 291-92.
132. Cf Kushan,supra note 44, at 757 58 (noting that imposition of intellectual property policies by
the developed nations onto the developing nations is comparable to neocolonialism). See also J.H.
Reichman,Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 335,339-
40 (1997) ("Few things touch the delicate nerve of national sovereignty more than the autonomous
capacity of states to administer their domestic laws in conformity with their own legal philosophies.
States that have only recently achieved economic and political independence will especially resent
other, more powerful states sitting in judgment of the way they exercise their sovereignty....").
133. See generally Taylor & Cayford,supra note 125, at 382 (discussing the slow but promising rise
in awareness among policymakers of the need for change in U.S. patent policies).
134. Cf. id. at 399.
135. See, e.g., CHuA,supra note 44, at 232; Kushan, supra note 44, at 757-58.
136. See Heald, supra note 2, at 543.
137. See generally id. (discussing the need to change the rhetoric surrounding issues of bio-
prospecting).
138. See supra Part III.A.4.
139. Seegenerally Taylor & Cayford, supra note 125, at 283-84 (discussing the slow but promising
rise in awareness among policymakers of the need for change in U.S. patent policies).
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U.S. patent policies are not without positive effects that outweigh the desire to
adjust for bioprospecting. 4 ° As explained below, by considering dominant glo-
bal themes 4' with the bioprospecting debate, it may be possible to reframe the
proposed sui-generis-amendment solutions in such a manner as to preserve the
positive effects of current U.S. patent policies while addressing the need to pro-
tect traditional knowledge. Specifically, focusing resolution of the bioprospect-
ing debate on increased international competition 2 and the response of globally
concerned local citizens'43 shows how possible resolution of the bioprospecting
debate can be achieved in a way likely to garner grass-roots support.'
A. International Competition
Bioprospecting is naturally implicated by an understanding of globalization
that involves the increasing movement of goods, knowledge, and technology
across international borders.'45 As has been demonstrated, bioprospecting is the
movement of traditional knowledge from the developing country as a point of
origin to the developed country as a point of production.'46 Goods are then
shipped back across borders in reverse order, from developed country to devel-
oping country and others in the global marketplace as rich multinational corpo-
rations increase profits at the expense of undeveloped, indigenous cultures. 7
When viewed through this global lens, the rise of bioprospecting activities
creates concern analogous to a "race-to-the-bottom" for control over indigenous
knowledge. 4 As one commentator notes:
140. See generally Heald,supra note 2 (outlining positive effects of bioprospecting, including the
potential for finding medicinal cures and protecting biogenetic resources, and negative effects of
regulation, including increasing the scope of already broad IP rights and increasing transaction
costs and the potential for government corruption).
141. See generally DAVID HELD & ANTHONY McGREw, THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER (2d
ed. 2003) (collecting works into five common themes of globalization: the reconfiguration of power
and authority of states, the loss of a singular cultural identity, the dominance of the world market-
place, the perpetuation of inequality among nations, and the emergence of new extranational entities).
142. Supra Part IV.A.
143. Supra Part IV.B.
144. See Healdsupra note 2, at 543.
145. See International Monetary Fund, Globalization: Threat or Opportunity? (Apr. 12, 2000),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm#1.
146. See supra Part I.
147. Id.
148. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization and Federalism: Governance at the Domestic Level, in Cop-
INC WITH GLOBALIZATION 94, 98-99 (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart eds., 2000).
666 JONATHAN B. WARNER
Globalization encourages increasingly intense international com-
petition among nations, states and cities to attract and keep indus-
tries that they believe can create economic growth in their areas.
Though the location of a plant or manufacturing operation turns
on numerous, primarily cost-related factors, low taxesi] and the
imposition of minimal regulatory costs on industries located in
these jurisdictions usually constitute important elements of a
jurisdiction's strategy to attract industry and jobs to a particular
locale.149
Hence, as the wealth of the bioprospecting industry increases, the likely regula-
tion of this industry decreases. 5
Rather than relying solely on the sui-generis-amendment solutions to the
bioprospecting debate, developing countries may find that the most protective
measure would be the adoption of an intellectual property system competitive
with that of the United States. 15' For example, the developing countries at issue
could seek to establish laws that allow for a broader range of patents for individ-
uals, including those sought on traditional-knowledge-based products. 152 How-
ever, as developing countries often view such property as community-based
property,'53 these new laws could create a localized dual-rights system. The
patent would be recognized as valid in the developing country-and therefore
also valid abroad under TRIPS154-but the patent's monopolistic rights would
be unenforceable within the developing country, which is not likely to be a bio-
prospecting company's target market. 55 In other words, the bioprospecting firm
would get a patent in the country where the knowledge on which the patent is
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. Cf. id.
152. See generally Michael W. Smith, Bringing Developing Countries' Intellectual Property Laws to
TRIPS Standards: Hurdles and Pitfalls Facing Vietnam's Efforts to Normalize an Intellectual Property
Regime, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 211 (1999) (discussing the economic, legal, and social issues in-
volved when a non-Western, developing nation adopts Western-style intellectual property protec-
tion to encourage foreign investment and involvement in world trade). The United States' broad
policy for patents available on an individual or corporate basis was announced in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
153. Cf. Aoki,supra note 8, at 26-28 (discussing the difficulty in shifting the mindset of indige-
nous people from a communal-property understanding to a personal-rights understanding).
154. See id. at 20, 26-27.
155. See id.; Kadidal,supra note 19, at 376-78.
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based originated, but this patent would only be enforceable in the international
arena.1 6 This system would maintain the developing nation's internal market
over the traditional knowledge, 5 7 while at the same time maintaining bio-
prospecting companies' incentives to gather and distribute potentially life-
saving medicines.15 1 Such a system would also be to the economic advantage of
both the developing countries and the bioprospecting companies. Developing
countries already have the cost-related advantages of location and access to tra-
ditional resources and bioresources,5 9 and adapting competitive intellectual
property laws could encourage multinational corporations to establish regional
locations to take advantage of this protection, location, and access.
60
This legal proposal directly addresses the commonly identified problems
and benefits of bioprospecting. This proposed system may present ideological
conflicts, at least insofar as the developing country is acquiescing to northern de-
mands of intellectual property recognition."' Nevertheless, these conflicts could
be mitigated by the fact that the legal change stems from the country of the tra-
ditional knowledge's origin. 6 2 In addition, these conflicts could be mitigated by
requiring the patent to be unenforceable in the jurisdiction where the traditional
156. Notably, this solution amounts to a legal endorsement of W.R. Grace's actions regarding the
neem patent, since W.R. Grace has elected to develop its neem products and research in India and
not to enforce its otherwise internationally valid patent within India. See Marden,supra note 1, at
285. As noted by the W.R. Grace example, this solution presents a minimal risk of adverse eco-
nomic impact against indigenous persons and instead presents a real likelihood of socioeconomic
gain. See id. But see Kadidal, supra note 19, at 376-78. Hence, this solution also presents a level of
concession to the likelihood that bioprospecting will continue to be permitted at least in Western
nations.
157. Cf. Aoki, supra note 8, at 20, 26-27; Kadidal, supra note 19, at 376-78 (both authors noting
the targeting of the U.S. market over the indigenous markets by bioprospecting companies).
158. See Heald, supra note 2, at 531 ("Hundreds of important and efficacious drugs have already
been developed from plants found in developing countries. In fact, four-fifths of all drugs have
their basis in natural plant resources.").
159. See SHIvA,supra note 1, at 48.
160. See Aman,supra note 148, at 98-99.
161. See Kushan, supra note 44, at 757-58 ("Southern countries argued that strong intellectual
property rights would create instruments that would be used by Northern companies to hinder
the flow of technology into Southern markets.").
162. See Angela R. Riley, "Straight Stealing": Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property
Protection, 80 WASH. L. REv. 69, 131 (2005) ("The development of sui generis systems would allow
indigenous peoples... to finally control the integrity, disposition, and appropriation of their sa-
cred knowledge. Thus... this proposal merely puts indigenous groups on the same footing as
other citizens.").
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knowledge behind the patent originates.'63 Despite this localized nonenforce-
ability, bioprospecting firms could still find these patents favorable because of
the recognition of the patent's validity by the developing country. This, in turn,
would be a guarantee that the developing country would not litigate or chal-
lenge that patent's validity in either that country or in another country that en-
forces the patent. 4 This competitive legal system would also allow the benefits
of bioprospecting, such as finding and disseminating medicinal advances,' 5 to
be retained. At the same time, the North-South divide would be attacked since
the multinational firms would be employing local citizens and paying local taxes
rather than further feeding a developed nation."6 Loss of global biodiversity
could also be mitigated, as genetic information would be more readily available
to companies that can preserve that information, 6 7 and information not yet pre-
served could be guarded by local groups. 66 Such a system would guarantee the
local protection of traditional knowledge in places where the knowledge origi-
nated, since it is the host country that is initiating the legal change.'69
Increased international competition also emphasizes the important role non-
U.S. economies can have on the global marketplace. 70 Underlying this role is the
decentralization of the private sector-increasing globalization results in de-
creased centralization.' 7' This decentralization creates "horizontal forces" be-
tween multinational entities and nations.' 72 By diversifying location and
protective legal systems, no one national system can regulate the multinational en-
tity.' 73 Thus, competitive systems of protection are likely to encourage the local es-
tablishment of multinational entities. 74 Additionally, the increase in competitive
163. Cf Reichman, supra note 132, at 339-40 ("Few things touch the delicate nerve of national
sovereignty more than the autonomous capacity of states to administer their domestic laws in con-
formity with their own legal philosophies.").
164. See the turmeric plant example, supra at 648-49.
165. See Heald,supra note 2, at 531-32.
166. See Marden, supra note 1, at 280.
167. See Russell, supra note 47, at 689-90, 692.
168. See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 55, at 626-27; Coombe, supra note 55, at 280-82.
169. Cf Riley, supra note 162, at 118 ("Indeed, it is frustrating when laws exist to protect tradi-
tional knowledge, but they cannot be enforced in the individualized countries where most of the
commercial producers and consumers of indigenous cultural property actually live.").
170. See Aman,supra note 148, at 100.
171. See Alan M. Rugman & Alain Verbeke, Environmental Regulations and the Global Strategies
of Multinational Enterprises, in COPING WITH GLOBALIZATION, supra note 148, at 77, 78.
172. See Aman,supra note 148, at 100-01.
173. See id. at 101.
174. See id. at 99.
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intellectual property laws in the developing world would strengthen the bargain-
ing power of the involved developing nations.
175
B. Embedded Globalization and the Response of Concened Citizens
Globalization also emphasizes the increasingly important role of nonstate
actors.176 Perhaps most significant is the effect globalization may have on local
citizens. 177 As has been noted:
Global citizenship involves multiple identities and the ability of
citizens to differentiate among the various roles that different lev-
els of government perform. At the same time, built into these
multiple identities are often conflicting and conflicted responses
to certain issues. What might further one's local interest might
harm the global competitiveness of the entities that contribute to
the economic health of an area or region.'
78
In this sense, then, globalization itself is "embedded" into a domestic culture and
individuals.
179
The multiple identities experienced by a global citizen create global con-
cerns and prompt global responses.' 0 Indeed, in this age, like no other, globally
concerned citizens can participate on the world stage.' 8' For example, the Center
for International Environmental Law in Washington, D.C. filed a petition for
175. Cf. Ragavan,supra note 121, at 2 ("[I1n order for traditional knowledge to be protected effec-
tively either within the prevailing intellectual property regime or by a separate regime, the bar-
gaining power of developing countries must be strengthened.").
176. See generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION
THROUGH LAW REFORM (2004) (arguing that the future of modern democracies depends on the
ability of citizens to affect global policies).
177. See Aman,supra note 148, at 101.
178. Id.
179. See AMAN, supra note 176, at x ("[G]lobalization is... embedded in our domestic institu-
tions, both public and private.").
180. See Aman, supra note 148, at 101; Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property, Genetic Re-
sources and Traditional Knowledge Protection: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally, 11 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 547, 565-76 (2003).
181. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 13 (1999).
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reexamination on an issued patent covering products of Ayahuasca.'8 2 As a result
of this petition, the issued patent was reversed.'83 Another group of pro bono
lawyers based in Washington, D.C. also recently challenged the validity of cer-
tain patents that incorporate indigenous Peruvian medicines.'84
As the above examples demonstrate, focusing resolution of the bioprospect-
ing debate on the response of globally concerned local citizens shows how U.S.
patents can be affected, increasing the economic incentive for bioprospecting com-
panies that are seeking patent protection to take added measures to ensure patent
validity. This response of consumers goes beyond the mere use of consumer power
to protest. 85 The economic incentive for multinational corporations to adhere to
the laws of developing nations, whether those laws represent sui generis systems
or internationally competitive laws, also can be established as the response of glo-
bally concerned citizens directly affects bioprospecting corporations.'
86
CONCLUSION
The bioprospecting debate presents a controversy that, at its extremes, in-
volves the conflicting views and interests of indigenous peoples and multinational
corporations. 8 7 As one commentator notes, "Joinly when indigenous peoples ...
and ... their cultural world views, customary laws, and ecological practices are
recognized as fundamental contributions to resolving local social justice concerns
will we be engaged in anything we can genuinely call a dialogue."
88
The current rhetoric of this debate fails to conceptualize the issues of bio-
prospecting in a manner that will generate grass-roots support. Shifting this de-
182. Glenn M. Wiser, U.S. Patent Office Rejects Patent on Indigenous Medicinal Plant, 15 ENVTL.
COMPLIANCE & LITIG. STRATEGY 5, 5 (2000).
183. Id. It is notable that the PTO reversed the issuance of the patent on the narrowest grounds
possible. Id. The patent was founded on a claim that the plant's flowers were novel in their color;
the PTO reversed, finding that samples of the plant contained at the Field Museum of Chicago
were indistinguishable in flower color from those claimed in the patent application, thereby mak-
ing the specimens known and available in the United States more than one year prior to the patent
application. Id. at 6;see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
184. Alicia Upano, D.C. Team Gets to the Root of the Problem, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 12, 2004, http://
www.piipa.org/Upanol I - 12-04.pdf.
185. See AMAN,SUpra note 176, at 179 (discussing this highly limited form of power).
186. Cf. Cutler, supra note 117, at 31 (discussing corporate use of economically efficient breach of
contract).
187. See Quinn,supra note 6, at 289.
188. Coombe,supra note 55, at 284-85.
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bate's focus through the lens of globalization emphasizes the role non-U.S.
economies and nonstate actors can have on the global economy and the global
culture. In this manner, sensitivity toward developing economies and indige-
nous persons can be accounted for through an internationally competitive intel-
lectual property legal system adopted by developing countries. This proposal
addresses the negative effects of bioprospecting while also retaining the positive
effects. With the use of embedded globalization and competitive international
legal systems, the status quo can be changed in promotion of the common good,
and globalization can help to reduce poverty and inequality.

